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Abstract
This paper asks why 30 years of economic development in the small north Indian village of
Palanpur has been less positive than one might have hoped.  While per capita incomes have
risen and poverty has declined, progress has been painfully slow.  Moreover there has been
veritable stagnation in educational outcomes, and the village remains economically and socially
stratified.  Technological change in agriculture and non-farm diversification have been the main
forces of economic growth during this period, but population growth has prevented per capita
incomes from rising markedly.  In addition, high and persistent levels of inequality in Palanpur
have resulted in the capture of village-level collective institutions and the diversion of public
programs.  The village credit and tenancy markets have also evolved in response to the changing
external economic environment.  We suggest that over time the poor have become less able to
participate in these markets.
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Development
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1.  Introduction
India’s profile on the international economic stage has risen considerably during the 1990s.  In
the early years of the decade the government of India launched the country onto a new
development path by introducing a far-reaching liberalization package for the Indian economy.
After nearly ten years, and several changes in government, this reform process seems to have
become well entrenched. While not everyone agrees on the precise form, or the required pace, of
further reform efforts, there seems to be no serious move to turn the clock back.
Indeed, there would seem to be little to warrant a reversal.  Per-capita economic growth in India
has picked up significantly during the 1990s, such that by the second half of the decade growth
rates of 5-6% per annum have become the norm.  This performance is an order of magnitude
higher than the “Hindu rate of growth” (around 2% per annum) which had seemed the best
possible in the decades up to the 1990s.
1
Yet, a question which has preoccupied many observers of the Indian economy is to what degree
the country’s impressive economic performance has actually translated into improved standards
of living for the population. In particular, has India’s recent economic performance tangibly
improved the living standards of  the poor?
2
Such questions can be pursued on many fronts.  Analysis of statistical data has always been a
popular activity in India, thanks to a long tradition of data collection in the country. For example,
the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) has been carrying out large scale, comparable,
household surveys on a regular basis since independence, and these have been widely analysed
to study poverty in India.
3  Recently, the NSSO has taken the additional, very welcome, step of
making its household surveys publicly available at the unit record level. The NSS data are far
from the only data source available. Other important data collection efforts have been carried out
                                                
1 The Indian economy’s seeming imperviousness to the economic crisis which buffeted the east Asian economies
during the 1ate 1990s has only added further to its apparent lustre.
2 Drèze and Sen (1995) have drawn attention to the myriad impediments to poverty reduction in India, and have
argued that economic growth, on its own, cannot be expected to resolve all of them.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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by, for example, the National Centre for Applied Economic Research (NCAER), not to mention
innumerable smaller-scale surveys.  While the volume of work has been considerable and
progress is being made, it is probably not wrong to state that, at this stage, a full answer to the
questions raised above has not yet emerged.
4  Research on this front continues.
A second research front has been via the rich tradition of detailed case studies, usually village
studies, carried out in India by researchers with a whole host of disciplinary backgrounds.  Many
have had a longitudinal dimension, and not a few have been specifically concerned with the
question of how living standards have evolved over time.
5  A common feature of many village
studies is the close detail that they provide about their setting.  In this way they have often been
able to flesh out, and/or qualify, the broad findings from large-scale sample surveys. They have
also been valuable in raising new questions for subsequent statistical analysis.  Of course, one
must be very careful with generalising from village studies - their strength lies in the detailed
information they provide, not in allowing broad inferences to be made.
Detailed village studies do not generally lend themselves to short turnaround. For this reason, I
am not aware of any village studies that address the specific question of how rural welfare has
evolved specifically as a result of the economic reforms of the 1990s. In fact, although
liberalisation of the Indian economy has produced impressive results in terms of aggregate
economic performance, it is unclear to what extent the specific package of reforms has
influenced rural areas directly.
6  This does not mean, however, that village studies are not able to
provide some pointers to the possible impact of economic reforms on the rural population. The
issue then becomes one of thinking about the possible mechanisms that might have a role to play.
                                                                                                                                                            
3 Datt (1997) and Datt and Ravallion (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) have made extensive and influential use of a time
series of poverty estimates which they have constructed from the 25-odd rounds of NSS household surveys which
have been fielded since independence. See also, Abhijit Sen (1996).
4 Poverty measures during the 1990s have fluctuated rather than move in uniform direction.  An important, and
related, question has been about the evolution of inequality during this decade.  See Deaton and Tarozi (1999) for
detailed examination of issues involved in poverty comparisons in India over time.
5 Breman, Kloos and Saith (1997) bring together a selection of recent  village studies.  Jayaraman and Lanjouw
(1999) and Barbara Harris-White (1992) survey a range of village studies, focussing on rural poverty.  Hockings
(1999) also provides an interesting overview.  Special mention should be made of the extensive range of studies
arising out of the village-level data collected by the International Centre for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT).  Walker and Ryan (1990) provide a valuable overview.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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The level of detail offered by village studies, even if they do not refer exclusively to the 1990s,
can then be of considerable value.
This paper presents a detailed description of economic development in one village in Uttar
Pradesh between the late 1950s and the early 1990s.  The objective is first to trace the evolution
of well-being, in both economic and in broader terms, over this extended time period.  The
principle conclusion is that the picture is mixed – some progress but also not a little stagnation:
“a sort of growth”.
The paper then sets out to explore the factors prompting such a lukewarm assessment. First, a
brief description of the main forces of change for the village economy is provided.   Between
1957 and 1993, agricultural practices have been transformed as a result of new technologies.
Occupational diversification has been far reaching.  Against this, however, the village population
has more than doubled. These factors can be viewed, at least to some extent, as exogenous to the
village, and constitute elements of the changing overall environment to which the village has had
to adapt over time.
We turn next to factors internal to the village, which may also have played a role in generating a
mixed outcome.  We provide first a brief assessment of the full range of government
interventions which have been launched in the village over the survey period.  The assessment is
largely negative, and we suggest that the pervasive inequalities within the village at least partly
account for this.  There is little reason to suppose that these inequalities will disappear in the face
of a liberalizing economic environment.
We then inquire into the operation of two important village institutions: the land leasing market;
and the village moneylender.  We find that while these institutions continue to function, and
remain very relevant to the village economy, they have also evolved over time. What is worrying
is that the direction of change is often away from the weakest groups in the village.  Indeed, we
find that in many respects the poor are now more excluded from the main village markets than
                                                                                                                                                            
6 Srivastava (1996), reports on a survey carried out in eight villages of eastern Uttar Pradesh in 1996, in which only
12 respondents out of a total of 116 expressed any awareness whatsoever of the economic reforms of the earlyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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they were before.  There is no evidence, and no obvious reason to expect, that changes in the
broad parameters of the Indian economy during the 1990s will reverse these developments.
2.  The Palanpur Study
Palanpur is a village in Moradabad District of west Uttar Pradesh in north India.  The village has
been the subject of study since 1957-8, when it was surveyed by the Agricultural Economics
Research Centre (AERC) of the University of Delhi.
7  The AERC resurveyed the village in 1962-
3.   In 1974-5 Christopher Bliss and Nicholas Stern selected Palanpur as a village in which to
study the functioning of rural markets and the behavior of farmers.   They spent just under a year
residing in the village and collecting quantitative data, based on a set of questionnaires they
designed and fielded, as well as qualitative information emerging out of informal discussion and
observation.  Bliss and Stern published a book based on their investigations (Bliss and Stern,
1982), which has a primary focus on the 1974-5 survey year.
8
A fourth resurvey of Palanpur took place in 1983-4 when Jean Drèze and Naresh Sharma, in
close consultation with Bliss and Stern, lived in the village for fifteen months, once again
collecting data for the entire village population.
9  The most recent re-survey of the village, once
again by Drèze and Sharma, was conducted in 1993.  This survey was carried out over a shorter
period and is consequently somewhat less comprehensive.
10
A considerable body of research has emerged from the Palanpur research program.
11 A recent
edited volume by Lanjouw and Stern (1998) brings together a set of these studies and attempts to
distill the main findings.  This volume touches on most of the themes discussed in the earlier
                                                                                                                                                            
1990s.
7 Ansari (1964) reports on the findings of this village-wide survey.
8 Some comparisons with the earlier survey years were reported, but a longitudinal perspective was not given a
major emphasis.
9 One of the relatively special features of the Palanpur study is that detailed information is collected from the all
households in the village rather than a sample of households.
10 Between the main survey years, there were also additional, shorter, visits to Palanpur  by the original investigators
as well as by collaborating researchers.
11 For example: Ansari (1964), Bliss and Stern (1982), Drèze (1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1997), Drèze, Lanjouw and Stern
(1992), Drèze and Mukherjee (1989), Drèze and Saran (1995), Kynch (1994), Kynch and Maguire (1986, 1989), P.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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book by Bliss and Stern (1982), but includes a more explicit focus on outcomes and processes of
change over the entire period from 1957-8 to 1993.  The material in this paper is taken largely
from the various contributions included in Lanjouw and Stern (1998), and the reader is referred
to this study for further details on what, for reasons of space, will often have to be rather cursory
treatment here.
Snapshot of the village in 1993
At the beginning of the last survey (in mid-1993), Palanpur had a population of 1,133 persons,
divided into 193 households (Table 1).  Hindus represented 87.5 per cent of the village
population, and Muslims the remaining 12.5 per cent.  Hindus were divided into six main castes
(ranging from 14 to 48 households in size), and three minor castes of three households or less
(Table 2).  The shares of Hindus and Muslims in the total population, and the relative sizes of the
main castes, have remained fairly stable throughout the survey period.
Thakurs, Muraos and Jatabs can be seen, in many respects, as the main players in Palanpur’s
economy and society.  The other castes are numerically smaller and also tend to be less cohesive,
so that their collective influence on the village economy and society is more restricted.  At risk of
caricaturing somewhat, Thakurs can be viewed as representative of Uttar Pradesh’s traditional
martial castes, Muraos comprise the cultivating castes, often occupying a central position in the
village economy, and the Jatabs represent the ‘scheduled castes’ (accounting for nearly 25% of
the population of Uttar Pradesh).
The economy of Palanpur is essentially  one of small-farmers.  The proportion of landless
households (23 per cent) is relatively small by Indian standards and there are no clearly
outstanding large farmers.  The bulk of economic activity is in agriculture, although  a non-
negligible share of village income also comes from wage employment outside the village.  The
economy is by and large a market economy with few restrictions on production and exchange.
However, the village’s economy does differ from standard textbook models of market economies
                                                                                                                                                            
Lanjouw (1992, 1994), J.O. Lanjouw (1999), Lanjouw and Stern (1989, 1991), Mukherjee (1991, 1993), Mukherjee
and Ray (1991), Sharma (1992), Sharma and Drèze (1990) and van Bastelaer (1986).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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as a result of factors such as  incomplete markets, imperfect information, transactions costs, and
extra-economic coercion.  We will refer to some of these features of the economy further below.
3.  Development in Palanpur:  Outcomes
How have livelihoods fared in Palanpur between 1957-8 and 1993?  We attempt to provide a
partial answer to this question by documenting the evolution of both economic and social
outcomes during this period.
3.1 Economic Outcomes
Average income
The growth rate of private incomes in Palanpur is not easy to assess, for several reasons.  First,
the coverage of income sources and the method used for calculating household incomes were not
exactly the same for each survey, although the estimates for each survey year were based on the
same notion of income as net returns to all household assets.  While some error certainly remains
in individual income estimates, the individual errors do not invalidate comparisons of per-capita
incomes between different years.  Second, nominal income figures for each year must be deflated
by a price index to become comparable, and the resulting real income estimates can be quite
sensitive to choice of index.  Sensitivity analysis to different price indices revealed, however,
that in our context broad observations were quite robust.  Finally, it is important to note that
private incomes can fluctuate a great deal from year to year, as a result of the varying quality of
harvest.  Available evidence suggests that the harvest was fair in 1957-8, poor in 1962-3, good in
1974-5 and poor in 1983-4. These fluctuations in the quality of harvest have to be borne in mind
while examining income trends and related economic changes in Palanpur.  Bearing these
qualifications in mind, Table 3 presents income levels for the survey years from 1957-8 to 1983-
4.
 12
                                                
12 The shorter duration of the 1993 survey prevented collection of the detailed economic information necessary to
construct an income measure for 1993 which is comparable to that of the earlier survey years.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Based on the figures in Table 3, it appears that real per-capita incomes in Palanpur grew between
1957-8 and 1984-5, but not rapidly.
13  As in most parts of India during this period, economic
growth was sluggish.  Even so, per-capita income growth in Palanpur is widely acknowledged by
villagers themselves to have resulted in an expansion of purchasing power.  This is confirmed by
a steady accumulation of household assets (see further below).
Poverty
Alongside the growth in average per-capita  income there has been some decline in absolute
poverty (Table 3).  The proportion of the village population below a poverty line of Rs 140 per
capita per year in 1960-1 prices (corresponding roughly to the line proposed by Dandekar and
Rath, 1971) has declined from 47% in 1957-8 to 34% in 1983-4.  This comparison is possibly
somewhat conservative, given that the harvest in 1983-4 was exceptionally poor.  If we compare
the average of 1957-8 and 1962-3 head count indices with the average of 1974-5 and 1983-4
(each average covering a good and a poor agricultural year) we find that the latter is less than
half as high as the former.  The broad qualitative conclusion of declining poverty is also
confirmed on the basis of more sophisticated measures of poverty (such as the poverty gap and
squared poverty gap measures).
It is important to stress that the fall in poverty in Palanpur is not terribly impressive. The poverty
line chosen in these calculations is extremely conservative, so that poverty defined in these terms
is almost unimaginably severe.  Yet even by the later survey years a significant fraction of the
village population (perhaps one in five persons), continued to suffer from such destitution.
Income Inequality
In the presence of rising average income, it is possible for absolute poverty to decline without
there being any change in the distribution of income. Table 3 indicates that inequality has
                                                
13 Without any correction for fluctuating harvest quality real per capita incomes grew by 1.4%.  One way of
adjusting for harvest quality is to estimate the growth rate between the 1957-63 sub-period and the 1974-84 sub-
period (where each sub-period income is the simple average of the two respective survey years, and each pair
includes one good and one poor agricultural year).  The trend growth rate calculated in this way is about 2.2%.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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fluctuated, but not followed an obviously monotonic course over the 1957-84 period.  The Gini
coefficient of per capita incomes rose between 1957-8 and 1962-3, fell between 1962-3 and
1974-5, and rose again between 1974-5 and 1983-4.  The most pronounced change occurred
between 1962-3 and 1974-5, when for example the Gini coefficient declined from 0.39 to 0.25.
Once again, however, if one were to take the two former years as a pair, and the latter two as a
pair, there seems to have been a slight decline in income inequality.
14
While this direction of change is encouraging, it is once again, not dramatic and is starting from
a very high base.  The overall conclusion regarding income inequality in Palanpur must remain
that the village is a far from a homogenous community. This high degree of economic
stratification is argued, below, to account at least in part for the general failure of public action in
Palanpur during the entire survey period.
Wealth
Ownership of productive assets and consumer durables has expanded over the survey period
(Table 4).
15  It is difficult to translate the figures on ownership into estimates of aggregate value
of assets in different survey years.  Some tentative calculations can, however, be presented for
1962-3 and 1983-4 (Table 5). 
16  The aggregate value of quantifiable assets other than land, at
1960-1 prices, is estimated to have risen from Rs 41,055 in 1962-3 to Rs 87,667 in 1983-4.
17  In
real per capita terms this corresponds to an annual growth rate of 1.25 per cent.  Although
positive, the growth of wealth seems less rapid than what a visual assessment of Table 4 might
suggest.  This “optical illusion” is due to the change in accumulation patterns which may be
partly driven by changes in relative prices.  Many consumer durables, for instance, are now much
                                                
14 Only in the case of the Atkinson measure of inequality with an inequality aversion parameter value of 2 or higher
does inequality in 1983-4 exceed that in 1957-8 survey.  The 1974-5 survey year appears unambiguously the most
equal and the 1962-3 survey year the most unequal.  See Lanjouw (1994) for an analysis of inequality in Palanpur
within the stochastic dominance framework.
15 Only in the case of Persian wheel irrigation devices and livestock is the picture of accumulation less obvious.
Subsititution of Persian wheels by motor driven pumpsets accounts for the decline in the former as irrigation
devices.  The decline in livestock is associated with both a displacement of livestock by tractors, and also the
increased opportunity cost of fodder as village land is put to other uses.
16 Details can be found in Chapter 2 and the appendix to Chapter 3, Lanjouw and Stern (1998).
17 The wealth figures also exclude the value of buildings, jewelry and foodstuffs (see chapter 2, by Drèze, Lanjouw
and Sharma, in Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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cheaper relative to (say) cattle than they were in 1957-8. The substitution from the latter to the
former can easily give a spurious impression of capital accumulation, because the decline of
cattle ownership is much less conspicuous than the accumulation of consumer durables.
Gross wealth is not the indicator of ultimate interest however.  To arrive at an estimate of net
wealth, it is necessary to deduct liabilities (mainly debts to credit institutions).  Debts have
grown very rapidly over the survey period, from around Rs 12,000 in 1962-3 to Rs 64,320 in
1983-4 (at 1960-1 prices).  These institutional debts have been largely geared to land
improvement and have a counterpart in increasing land prices.
18  Including both land assets as
well as liabilities, the average annual growth rate of net wealth per capita at constant prices
ranged somewhere between 0.8 and 2.0 per cent per year.
The distribution of gross wealth has remained quite stable between 1962-3 and 1983-4 (Table 5).
This is largely due to the importance of land in overall asset holdings and the stable distribution
of land ownership over time.  Going from asset ownership only to net wealth raises the problem
that in 1983-4 sixteen households had negative net wealth.  With negative observations the Gini
coefficient of per capita net wealth in 1983-4 loses its usual interpretation.  Simply replacing the
negative observations by zero results in a Gini coefficient of 0.55 - markedly higher than the
corresponding value of 0.46 for 1962-3. As this is clearly an underestimate of wealth inequality
we can conclude with confidence that wealth inequality has increased between 1962-3 and 1983-
4.
3.2.  Social Outcomes
While economists traditionally focus on economic outcomes in arriving at an assessment of
“development” over time, it is clear that this provides at best a partial picture of how living
standards are changing.
19  We examine briefly below changes over time in three important non-
                                                
18 Rough estimates of the average value of land in 1962-3 were obtained from 1983-4 data on land prices by
assuming (1) that the value of irrigated land in 1962-3 was somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of its 1983-
4 value (at constant prices) and (2) that the value of non-irrigated land in 1962-3 was about one third of the value of
irrigated land.  These are both conservative assumptions.
19 Drèze and Sen (1989, 1995) argue persuasively for a need to look beyond measures of income and/or
consumption, and to examine all indicators which influence individuals’ capabilities.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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income dimensions of well-being in Palanpur.  We start by examining progress in the spread of
education.  We then ask how relations between castes have evolved over the survey period.  We
finally consider the position of women in the village society.
Education
Educational achievements in Palanpur have remained extremely poor throughout the survey
period.  In 1957-8, literacy rates for persons aged 7 and above were as low as 18 per cent for
males and 0.5 per cent for females.  By the end of the period, in 1993,  the corresponding figures
were 37 per cent for males and 9 per cent for females (Table 6).  Even in younger age groups, in
1993, literacy rates remain low.  Not even a third of adolescents aged 15-19 had learnt to read
and write by the last survey year.  If anything, progress on the educational front has been even
more sluggish than on the economic front.  The distance still to cover before universal primary
education is achieved, much less aside secondary and higher education, is sobering.
Caste
In Palanpur, caste exercises not only an important social function but also influences economic
behavior and outcomes.  As was mentioned in the introduction, there are three main castes in the
village accounting for about two thirds of the population: Thakurs, Muraos and Jatabs (see Table
2).  Relations between at least some of these three castes have  been evolving in significant ways
since 1957-8.
Highest in the village social hierarchy are the Thakurs, a caste whose traditional social role was
of rulers and warriors.  Traditionally Thakurs had the largest landholdings in the village which,
because of an aversion to manual labor, they usually leased out or cultivated with hired labor.
Declining land endowments and rising real wages have now compelled most of them to take up
cultivation.  Thakurs have also been keen to take advantage of new employment opportunities
outside the village.  Politically, the Thakurs are still the most powerful caste in Palanpur, but
they are no longer the unquestioned leaders of the village.  Muraos, whose rising prosperity
inspires much respect in the village, have started challenging their supremacy.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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The Muraos are the only caste in Palanpur whose traditional occupation is cultivation.   In 1957-
8 their per-capita land endowments were roughly the same as those of the Thakurs, but over the
survey period they have accumulated land, and now have the best land endowments in the
village.  Good land, hard work, sustained thrift and excellent farming skills have enabled the
Muraos to take advantage of recent technological change in agriculture. They have been so
successful in this domain that  they have tended to eschew involvement in non-agricultural
activities. The economic status of Muraos has considerably improved over the survey period, and
this has carried over into some rise in social status as well.
An examination of evolving caste relations based on scrutiny of the Muraos and Thakurs would
suggest considerable dynamism.  At the bottom end of the hierarchy, however, the situation of
the Jatabs appears frozen in place.  The Jatabs are socially and economically the most deprived
caste in Palanpur. They own little land, live in a cluster of shabby mud dwellings, and earn most
of their income from casual labor and subsistence farming.  Illiteracy among Jatabs has been near
universal throughout the survey period, and few Jatabs have succeeded in obtaining regular
employment outside the village at any stage.
20  There is little sign of growth in per-capita income
for the Jatabs.   So, in relative terms, their incomes have sharply declined over the survey period:
in the first two survey years the average per-capita income of Jatab households was about 70% of
the village average.  By the later pair of survey years the corresponding proportion was barely
50%.  In terms of access to land the Jatabs have also experienced little advancement.  Even
though Jatabs are as involved in cultivation as the Muraos and Muslims, unlike those two groups
they have not succeeded in increasing their land endowments.  In fact, between 1983/84 and
1993 the Jatabs lost 10 per cent of their land, mainly due to one household selling most of its
land to repay mounting debts.
Although in some symbolic respects the disadvantaged position of the Jatabs has become less
obvious over time (Jatabs are now able to sit on string cots alongside other castes, and are able to
draw water from the same wells) their weak position remains clear.  Jatabs continue to endure
                                                
20 Lanjouw and Stern (1998), chapter 3, indicate that even after controlling for wealth position and education levels,
Jatabs are significantly less likely to find regular employment in the non-farm sector.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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many forms of discrimination, not only on the part of fellow villagers but also from government
officials.  They have, for example, been a prime target of extortion by urban-based managers of
the local credit cooperative (see chapter 9, by Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, in Lanjouw and
Stern, 1998).
“Social development” in the dimension of caste relations in Palanpur has thus been a mixed
process.  On the one hand there is clear evidence of the erosion of the dominant position of the
Thakurs in the village hierarchy.  The Thakurs are increasingly being challenged by the Muraos
– a caste whose ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered by agricultural change has
been remarkable.  Yet, from the point of view of the poorest caste in Palanpur, their relative
position has improved hardly at all.  Few of the major changes and events which have taken
place in Palanpur over the survey period have appeared to exercise any postive impact on the
relative position of Jatabs in the village society.
Gender relations
There are few signs of any profound change in gender relations over the survey period.  The
overwhelming impression is of great persistence in the glaring inequalities between men and
women.  These inequalities are at their most stark when we consider the female-male ratio in
Palanpur.  This ratio has hovered around 0.86 throughout the survey period  (Table 7)– a level
which is incredibly low, but consistent with the general pattern in western Uttar Pradesh.
Similarly, there has been no basic change in women’s roles in the family and society, or in their
freedom of movement and action.
It is important to note that, unlike the Muraos’ rise vis-à-vis the Thakurs, there  appears to be
little change in the material basis of gender inequality.  There has been no major economic force
to induce greater gender inequality.  The norms of patrilineal inheritance (whereby male children
inherit land) and patrilocal exogamy (whereby women marry outsiders and move out of the
village to take up residence in their husband’s village) continue unchallenged.  The gender
division of labor, whereby women have minimal involvement in economic activities outside the
household, also remains the same.  In fact, some economic trends may even have made it harderWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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to achieve  more equal gender relations.  For example, dowry levels in Palanpur appear to have
increased sharply over time.  In so far as there is a link between dowry and the neglect of female
children, as Palanpur parents consistently argue, this development may have reinforced other
factors of gender discrimination in child care.
21
Our short review of the evolution of economic and social outcomes in Palanpur across the survey
period indicates that some improvement has taken place.  Even this cautious assessment merits
some qualifications, however.  First,  “progress” has been painfully slow, and in many cases
(such as poverty alleviation and the expansion of literacy) removes only a small fraction of the
shortfall which so urgently needs to be eliminated.   Second, even this assessment is not
universal: the distribution of net wealth appears to have worsened over time; in certain respects
the relative position of Jatabs in the village has weakened; and gender inequality shows no sign
of  improvement.  One of the key conclusions emerging from the Palanpur study is that these
persistent inequalities are not only abhorrent in normative terms, but also profoundly influence
the shape and form of the development path which is available to the village. We will consider a
few of the mechanisms underpinning this process in Section 5
.
4.  Forces of Change
Before turning to a discussion of some of the institutional factors behind Palanpur’s development
experience, it is important to briefly review the broad background against which development in
Palanpur has taken place.  Essentially there have been three, largely exogenous, forces of change
which have exercised a profound influence on the Palanpur economy.  These are population
growth, agricultural change, and occupational diversification.
Population Growth
                                                
21 Another example is the so called “Sanskritization” effect, which refers to the emulation of high-caste practices
(including in many cases those relating to women’s lifestyle, such as a more strict adherence to the practice of
purdah) by other castes experiencing economic improvement and aspiring to upward social mobility.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Between 1957-8 and 1993, the population of Palanpur roughly doubled (Table 7).  This has
presented the village with a crucial challenge, given that the amount of land has remained more
or less constant over the same period.  By 1993, land owned per person had declined to no more
than 0.33 acres.  This implies that, if Palanpur farmers had retained the same cultivation practices
as in the 1950s, total agricultural output would be equal to no more than 125 kgs of grain per
person per year.  Because of population growth, it was simply not possible for villagers to
maintain the same occupational patterns and technological practices as in the 1950s.
22
Agricultural Change
Technological change  in agriculture has occurred in three important respects: 1) an expansion in
irrigation (from about 50% of the village land in 1957-8 to virtually 100% by 1974-5); 2) the
adoption of modern cultivating practices involving new seeds, chemical fertilizers, better
irrigation and higher yields
23; and 3) some mechanization towards the end of the survey period.
The first two aspects of technological change can be seen as land-augmenting technological
change (permitting double cropping for example), while the last is more clearly associated with
labor displacement.
Technological change in agricultural has been associated with dramatic increases in yields (Table
8).  Wheat yields (the principal crop grown in the winter season) have more than doubled and
even more dramatic improvements have been recorded for paddy (one, among several, important
summer crops). It is clear that in the face of sharp population growth, these changes in
agricultural practices have been vital in preventing incomes from collapsing.
  However, while these achievements are remarkable, it would be misleading to imply that
cultivation in Palanpur is now on the frontier in terms of best-practice techniques.  In fact, there
                                                
22 While population growth has been an important factor of economic change, demographic change itself has been
quite slow in Palanpur.  The very high share of children in the population suggests that the growth of the Palanpur
population is not likely to slow markedly in the near future.
23 New seed varieties and fertilizers were first introduced in Palanpur in the mid 1960s so that the first two survey
years can be viewed as describing the situation prior to the introduction of these new technologies and the later
surveys describing the ex-post situation.  It should be stressed that although the term “Green Revolution” is often
employed, the process of technological change in Palanpur has been rather more incremental and cumulative than
the term suggests.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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is still much room for improvement. Palanpur farmers tend to sow late, they usually sow second-
rate or adulterated seeds, and are casual about other cultivation-related details such as weeding,
application of fertilizer, etc.  These shortfalls are associated with suboptimal investment levels
(linked to the operation of the credit market) and slow innovation (linked to poor basic education
levels).
A question which has exercised development economists for a very long time is the distributional
impact of the Green Revolution.  A common fear has been that small farmers would be unable to
adopt the new technologies and would slowly be driven out by larger landowners.  This scenario
does not apply in Palanpur, where technological change has been more or less scale-neutral.
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that some consequences of technological change can lead
to lower economic inequality.  The expansion of irrigation is a case in point.  In the early survey
years, the ownership of irrigation facilities was sharply concentrated among the wealthier
farmers.  As irrigation has expanded to more or less 100% of the village land, the distributional
impact has thus been largely progressive.  There is no basis for the presumption that the Green
Revolution has been a major force of economic polarization in Palanpur.   However, with respect
to the theme of this paper – trying to understand why well-being has not improved more
markedly – it is important to note also that the Green Revolution did not obviously overturn
existing inequalities.
Occupational Diversification
Economic development is often viewed in terms of the transfer of labor from the traditional low-
productivity sector to the modern, high-productivity sector.  In Palanpur two, related, trends have
taken place.  First, there has been a steady weakening of the traditional caste-based pattern of
occupations.  By 1993, among castes other than the Muraos, only three households in Palanpur (a
barber, a sweeper, and a carpenter) were engaged in their traditional occupation in the strictest
sense of the term.  Essentially, each caste is now engaged in some combination of cultivation and
(mainly non-agricultural) wage employment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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The second major development on the occupational front has been the expansion of non-
agricultural wage employment in Palanpur.  This has mainly taken the form of regular or semi-
regular employment outside the village (which is distinguished from “casual” daily wage
employment by a modicum of employment security, and usually involves monthly as opposed to
daily wage payments).  The number of adult men with regular or semi-regular wage employment
as a primary occupation rose from 5 in 1957-8 to 50 in 1993 (Table 9).
In Palanpur wage employment outside the village usually involves commuting to the nearby
towns within the district.
24  Employment occurs in a wide range of establishments, both public
and private.  Regular non-farm employment is much sought after by villagers in Palanpur, and
such indications of excess demand for employment in the non-agricultural sector raises the
question as to how these are allocated.  Often workers have to pay an “entry fee”.  In addition,
contacts are required.  As a result, persons with low social status seem to be at a disadvantage in
the competition for regular jobs, even given skills and endowments.
The expansion of non-farm occupations, like technological change in agriculture, has enabled
Palanpur to counter the impact of population growth on per-capita land endowments, and even to
achieve some per-capita income growth.
25  As with agricultural change, it seems that the
expansion of non-agricultural employment has not been a major force of polarization over the
survey period.  Rather, the distribution of non-agricultural employment opportunities seems to
broadly replicate existing patterns of inequality:  households with better resources and
connections tend to get the better-paid jobs, and there is no indication of non-agricultural
employment having a major impact on income distribution.  Here again, the distributional
consequences include positive as well as negative effects.  The expansion of employment
opportunities outside the village, for example, has played a crucial role in preventing the decline
of agricultural wages in the village itself (despite rapid population growth), and in enabling
landless households to diversify their occupations.
                                                
24  In Palanpur, much of the commuting occurs by train, as a railway line runs by the village.  In other villages
similar commuting goes occurs by road vehicle.  In Palanpur the nearest road is several kilometers away.
25 By 1983-4, non-farm income accounted for approximately a third of village income (for further details see chapter
3, by Bliss, Lanjouw and Stern, in Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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In sum, part of the answer to the question why economic development in Palanpur has not been
more far-reaching lies in the big, exogenous, forces of change which have affected the village.
In the absence of any other changes, population growth would most likely have had a devastating
impact on well-being in Palanpur. Alone this change would have caused falling incomes and
rising poverty.   Yet the two other broad forces of change have, on balance, more than offset this
effect.  Agricultural change has permitted Palanpur farmers to effectively increase their
landholdings (via double cropping), and to achieve a variety of productivity gains.  Yields have
increased dramatically as a consequence.  Non-farm employment expansion has also
counteracted the impact of population growth by introducing new sources of income into the
village, and by siphoning off excess agricultural labor from the village.  Both of these latter
forces are probably best seen as shifting the whole distribution of incomes along the income axis,
as opposed to dramatically changing the shape of this distribution.  While it is clearly important
that these factors have not resulted in a further rise in inequality, it is equally important to
recognise that they have done little to remove the pervasive and far-reaching inequalities which
had always been present in the village.
5.  Village-Level Constraints on Progress
We now turn to an examination of some additional elements in the story behind Palanpur’s, at
best modest, experience of development between the 1950s and the 1990s.  Unlike those
described in the previous section, the elements we focus on here are more specific to the village,
and may be viewed at least in part as endogenous to village-specific factors.  An important theme
here is that the widespread inequality in Palanpur, and the inability of the broad forces of change
to reduce this inequality, has had a bearing on the “failures” we describe below.  We consider
first, the track record of government interventions in Palanpur.  We then consider the operation
of the local land-leasing market, and turn finally to the village private credit market.
5.1  The Failure of Public Sector Service Provision
Since the 1957-8 survey year a reasonably wide range of government initiatives were introduced
in Palanpur.  It is clear that such public services and amenities can have a vital role to play inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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offering rural households the means to achieve a better quality of life. Elementary education and
health care, for example, are usually made available through public provision, and the
effectiveness of government activities in these fields can be a significant determinant of living
conditions.
The experience of public provisioning in Palanpur since 1957-8 has not been encouraging.  It has
not been a problem of government failure to recognise the need to expand available services.
Rather, with few exceptions, the services and programs which have been introduced suffer from
very low standards of operation, when they function at all.
One of the most glaring failures in this respect has been the experience with the village school in
Palanpur.  Although a school was set up in Palanpur at the beginning of the survey period, it has
had a precarious existence throughout the survey period.  In general, the problem has been that
the school’s single teacher has not been adequately supervised, and in the absence of
accountability mechanisms has been content to collect his permanent salary but otherwise not
exert himself.  In 1983-4 the village teacher was the son of the Thakur headman.  Usually he did
not take the trouble to even show up at school, and when he did it was often to concentrate his
attentions only on the children of his close relatives.  It is also important to note that the  student-
teacher ratio that would in theory have applied if the teacher had performed his duties, would
have most likely have prevented him from being very effective.
This combination of inattention to appropriate incentives and accountability mechanisms,
coupled with  inadequate funding,  recurs in the other schooling facilities that the government
has promoted (an adult literacy scheme), and has carried through to many other government
interventions in the village over the survey period.  These include: an integrated child
development scheme; village health care facilities; a land distribution program; the public
distribution system; public employment programs in the vicinity of Palanpur; a pension scheme
for widows; electricity supply; cooperative credit; and the integrated rural development program
(a poverty alleviation scheme).
   The result in all cases was a general failure to achieve intended
objectives. Only two modest examples of (qualified) success in Palanpur can be pointed to: a
land consolidation scheme; and installation of water handpumps in the village – one was placedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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just by the Jatab quarters.
26 On balance the conclusion is unambiguously that in terms of public
services and amenities, Palanpur is only marginally better now than it was in the beginning of the
survey period.
27
The Palanpur case study brings out that the failures of government intervention at the village
level are overwhelmingly of a political rather than financial or administrative nature.  Policies
that have had a strong backing from politically influential groups (such as affluent landowners)
have fared much better than others, even when their administrative requirements have been quite
exacting (such as land consolidation).  At the other extreme, the basic needs of politically
disadvantaged groups, such as primary education and health care, have been consistently
neglected, and redistributive programs have been systematically undermined by privileged
groups. This failure reflects two political realities: 1) redistribution has not been on the political
agenda of any of the ruling parties or coalitions in Uttar Pradesh since independence; and 2) at
the village level, collective institutions and public programs are comprehensively dominated by
privileged groups.
5.2  Village Institutions: Slipping Out of Reach of the Poor
Much of the research on Palanpur that has been carried out over the survey period has focussed
on the operation of village-level institutions, such as the land, labor and credit markets.
28  We
describe here two examples of how markets have been changing in Palanpur in response to the
general evolution of the village economy.  We focus in particular on how the response of the
village tenancy and credit markets to the changing economic environment has resulted in
declining access to land and credit of the poorer segments of the village population.  In other
words, economic development is affecting in important ways the manner in which village
markets operate, and evidence suggests that at least in some respects the poor have been made
worse-off.
                                                
26 See chapter 2, by Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, in Lanjouw and Stern (1998) for further details.
27 While our evidence is for Palanpur only, it is unlikely that Palanpur is an exception in this part of Uttar Pradesh
(see, for example, Drèze and Gazdar, 1997, for more on education in Uttar Pradesh).
28 See Sharma and Drèze (1996), Drèze and Mukherjee (1989) and Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (1998) for analyses
of the land, labor and credit markets in Palanpur.  See also chapters 7, 8 and 9 in Lanjouw and Stern (1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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The Tenancy Market
29
Tenancy is the main land market in Palanpur.
30  In Palanpur the proportion of land under tenancy
has been a significant fraction of land cultivated throughout the survey period.  For 1957-8, a
conservative estimate is that 10 per cent of cultivated land was under tenancy.  More accurate
estimates for the last three surveys indicate that tenancy amounted to 22 per cent of cultivated
land in 1974-5, 28  per cent in 1983-4 and 26 per cent in 1993.
A snapshot of the tenancy market in the 1983-4 or 1993 survey years, reveals the following main
features.  First, the bulk of tenancy contracts are sharecropping contracts (usually involving an
equal sharing of output), although there is a suggestion that fixed rent contracts are on the rise.
Second, in sharecropping contracts the landlord not only receives half of the output on the leased
plot, but he also contributes half of the cost of non-labor inputs (such as fertilizer, seeds, etc.).
Third, few households can be regarded as “pure” landlords or “pure” tenants; in fact many
households simultaneously lease-in and lease-out land.  Fourth, landlords and tenants tend to
resemble one another in many respects, such as average per-capita income levels, and even land
ownership levels.  Fifth, very few landless households lease in land. Sixth, quite a few tenants
are large landowners leasing in land from small landowners (the phenomenon of reverse
tenancy).  Seventh, there is little evidence of “Marshallian” inefficiency in sharecropping (yields
on owner cultivated plots are no higher than on sharecropped plots).
How does this picture compare to the situation in the earlier survey years?  Prior to the
intensification of agriculture, non-labor costs of cultivation were relatively unimportant.
Sharecroppers in Palanpur were mainly poor households owning little or no land, while landlords
were often large landowning Thakurs who shunned the life of cultivation, tended to be wealthier
and less risk averse, and to have access to credit.  Sharecropping contracts served as an important
vehicle for transferring a substantial risk of cultivation from the tenant to the landlord.
                                                
29 The discussion here is necessarily kept brief.  See Sharma and Dreze (1996) and chapter 2 by Sharma and Dreze,
in Lanjouw and Stern (1998) for further details.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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What accounts for the changes in the operation of the tenancy market?  With the transformation
of agriculture during the 1960s, cultivators rapidly adopted modern farming practices.  These
involved higher yields as well as much higher levels of non-labor inputs (especially irrigation
and fertilizer).  One consequence of this transformation was the growing importance of cost-
sharing for non-labor inputs.  A related implication was a considerable reduction in the economic
differentiation between landlords and tenants.  This occurred in part because poor households,
especially the landless, lost their ability to contribute their share of cultivation costs and were
pushed out of the lease market.  In addition, ownership of indivisible assets with imperfectly
marketable services (especially pumpsets and bores) created an incentive for some larger
landowners to lease in; and landlords also increasingly sought to team up with relatively well-
endowed tenants.
Sharecropping has been traditionally seen as a mechanism for the adjustment of land to labor
endowments.  This is how tenancy used to operate in Palanpur, and therefore was of particular
value to households with high labor to land ratios (such as the landless, and the poor in general).
The transition to modern agriculture, however, gives growing importance to the ownership of
other assets.  This has led to substantial changes in the socio-economic background of landlords
and tenants.  It has resulted in a noticeable increase in the share of tenanted land going to large,
wealthy farmers (the so-called ‘reverse tenancy’ phenomenon) and a clear decline in access of
poor landless households to land through tenancy.
The tenancy market in Palanpur remains a vibrant and important institution.  The key point here,
however, is that as a result of an exogenous process of agricultural  intensification, the institution
itself is evolving, and is slowly slipping out of reach of the poorer segment of village society.
This evolution has, in all likelihood, prevented the poor from benefiting more extensively from
the overall growth process.
                                                                                                                                                            
30 Land sales in Palanpur are very rare (see chapter 3 in Lanjouw and Stern, 1998, for further details).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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The Credit Market
31
Many of the distributional concerns one can raise about the tenancy market could, of course, be
addressed if the credit market in Palanpur operated well.  However, as in most rural settings in
the developing world, the credit market in Palanpur operates far from perfectly.
The Palanpur credit market is heavily segmented with four broad categories of credit sources:
public lending institutions, allies and patrons, urban pawnbrokers, and village moneylenders.  In
1983-4, outstanding debt amounted to 40 per cent of village annual income and nearly 85 per
cent of households were involved in some credit market transaction.  Public lending institutions
accounted for nearly 80 per cent of all outstanding loans in 1983-4, although this statistic
probably overstates the overall significance of the public sector source of credit because of a
much lower turnover of debts to public institutions. The other three sources of credit generally
accounted for a roughly equal share of the remaining outstanding debt.
Interest rates vary sharply across sources of credit.  Allies and patrons (generally from outside
the village) provide interest free credit, although these loans often do carry with them certain
obligations and can be associated with a loss of prestige.  Public sector institutions tend to lend at
interest rates ranging from 9-18% on cash loans and 25% per annum on loans in kind.  Urban
pawnbrokers lend at 30-36% per annum, and require gold or silver as collateral.  Village money
lenders lend at a spectrum of interest rates, but 60% was the  “standard” interest rate on cash
loans in 1993 and 50% on loans in kind.
A detailed description of the operation of each of these segments of the Palanpur credit market is
beyond the scope of the discussion here. However, as shown in Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma
(chapter 9 in Lanjouw and Stern, 1998) the poor do not have many options in the credit market.
The poor do not tend to have many allies and patrons that can provide them with interest free
credit.   The main public lending institution in Palanpur has evolved in such a way that not only
does it fail to service the poor, it in fact applies an elaborate, and highly fraudulent, accounting
                                                
31 A detailed description of the credit market in Palanpur is provided by Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, chapter 9 in
Lanjouw and Stern (1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
25
scheme which systematically discriminates against the poor.
32  Furthermore, the poor have no
jewelry that they can pawn with the urban pawnbrokers. The poor in Palanpur are thus compelled
to turn to the village moneylenders for credit.
How has the village moneylender segment of the credit market fared over the survey period?
Since the 1950s there has been an explosion in the availability of public sector credit to Palanpur
villagers.  This has been extremely important in supporting  much of the intensification of
agriculture which has taken place during this time period.  It has also been the hope of policy
makers in India that a flooding of low-cost, publicly provided credit into rural areas would
contribute to the demise of the village lender and his tendency to charge ‘usurious’ interest rates.
There has thus been a supposition that an additional benefit from expanding public sector credit
would be a decline in money lender interest rates.
In Palanpur the experience appears to have been the opposite.  Scrutiny of the data for the
various survey years suggests that the village ‘standard’ interest rate on loans from moneylenders
has risen in the following steps:
33  2 per cent per month in the 1950s, 3 per cent per month in the
mid 1970s, 3.5 per cent in the early 1980s, and 5 per cent per month in the mid 1980s.  This
involves an increase of real interest rates from about 2 per cent per month in the 1950s to a little
over 4 per cent per month in the mid 1980s.
One possible explanation is that interest rates in Palanpur reflect some monopoly power on the
part of a small number of regular moneylenders who have the ability to enforce repayment.
Further the expansion of institutional credit, with a pronounced bias in favor of priveleged
households, has largely taken care of anticipated cash requirements leaving the distress cash
needs of the poor households to be met by village lenders.  As a result, the demand for private
credit, which may have shrunk in quantitative terms, has also become more inelastic, leading,
under monopolistic pricing to an increase in interest rates.  Another possibility is that
institutional credit may also have soaked up the ‘good risks’, leading village lenders to deal with
                                                
32 See Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (chapter 9, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998) for a detailed description of the
extortionary Laut Badal ‘transfer entry’ scheme being applied by the Farmers Services Society in Palanpur.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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greater exposure to default by charging higher interest rates.  Whatever the reason, the evidence
is clear that the poor are now confronted with a higher cost of credit than in the past.  Once
again, this is likely to have played an important role in preventing the poor from participating
further in the general process of economic development.
6.  Conclusion
This paper has been concerned with the question of why the experience of economic
development in a small village in Uttar Pradesh, over a period of more than thirty years, has been
less positive than one might have hoped.  We have shown that some important progress has
taken place: per capita incomes have risen and poverty has declined over the survey period.
However, while the direction of change is encouraging, progress has been slow.  In addition,
next to these positive achievements, there has been stagnation in other dimensions.  Literacy
continues to languish at abysmal levels, and inequality in per capita incomes and wealth, or
between individuals of different castes or gender, remains very high, with no obvious prospects
for improvement.
We have indicated that there have been two major forces driving the improvements in economic
outcomes over time.  First, there has been far-reaching technological change in agriculture
associated with the Green Revolution.  This process has ushered in dramatic increases in yields
over the survey period.  Second, there has been a considerable expansion of employment
opportunities in the non-agricultural sector, representing an important new source of income for
the village.  An additional encouraging observation has been that on balance these forces do not
appear to have  had a strongly polarizing impact on the distribution of village incomes.
Arrayed against these positive developments, however, have been counteracting factors.  First
and most obviously, steady population growth in Palanpur has compelled the village economy to
run faster just to stand still.  Village landholdings have not increased over the survey period.  As
a result, population growth, by itself, would have resulted in a dramatic decline in per capita land
                                                                                                                                                            
33 Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma (chapter 9 in Lanjouw and Stern, 1998) describe how moneylender interest rates in
Palanpur tend to be more or less uniform across moneylenders at any point in time, although there have beenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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endowments and consequently in per capita agricultural incomes.  A major contribution of
technological change in agriculture and the expansion of employment opportunities has thus
been simply in preventing a sharp decline in well-being over the survey period.  In fact, as we
have seen, these forces have been strong enough to result in some increase in per capita incomes.
The other counteracting forces are less commonly discussed.  We have indicated that in
Palanpur, virtually the entire range of public services and programs introduced to the village
have failed to achieve their objectives.  An important consequence of this has been that  between
1957-8 and 1993 certain critical dimensions of wellbeing (such as education levels, particularly
of the poor) have shown little improvement over time.
34 We have suggested that an important
part of the explanation for this failure lies in the degree of social and economic stratification in
the village.  This stratification implies that at the village level, collective institutions and public
programs are comprehensively dominated by privileged groups – and in Palanpur these have
tended to appropriate or divert resources for their own benefit.  Economic forces which raise
incomes but which do not actually reduce disparities between households fail to remove the
brake on development that those disparities pose.
We also suggested that two important markets in Palanpur, the tenancy market and the village
private credit market, have been evolving as Palanpur’s basic economic configuration has
changed.  The point is that these institutions are endogenous to external forces, and we suggest
that the direction of change has been away from the weaker segments of the village society.  In
the past, the tenancy market in Palanpur was effective in providing a means for poor households
with (relatively) abundant labor power to acquire land for cultivation.  With intensification of
agriculture, complementary inputs, in addition to labor, have become extremely important.
Landlords now look for tenants who are capable of providing their share of these additional
inputs, and this process has gradually led to the poor being pushed out of the tenancy market.  It
is possible that the disappointing degree to which poverty has fallen in Palanpur is at least in part
due to this process.
                                                                                                                                                            
changes over time.
34  We have commented that low education levels may also explain, at least in part, why farmers are still far from
applying ‘best practice’ techniques and inputs to their land. (Another reason, also pertinent to this study, is the poor
operation of the credit market).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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A similar story can be told for the village private credit market.  We have indicated that in
Palanpur the poor are largely dependent on village money lenders for loans, as a result of their
being rationed out of access to credit from other (generally lower cost) sources of credit.   We
have further suggested that over time, village moneylender credit has become more expensive in
real terms.  This is surprising in light of the expectation that a dramatic increase in low-cost
publicly provided credit into rural areas would result in a gradual decline of moneylender interest
rates.  In fact, what appears to be occurring in Palanpur is that as subsidized credit becomes more
widespread, the pool of borrowers from moneylenders has changed.  One consequence may be
that the demand for moneylender loans is likely to have become more inelastic, resulting in
higher interest rates.  Another is that as traditionally “good” clients of moneylenders are diverted
to alternative credit sources, the moneylender no longer keeps interest rates down to entice the
“good” clients to borrow from him.  To the extent that the poor borrowers do not enjoy similar
access to alternative sources, the cost of credit to the poor then rises. Whatever the precise
explanation, the effect of rising moneylender interest rates is that the poor are increasingly
constrained from making the types of investments which would permit them to participate more
extensively in the economic growth process.
What are the possible lessons that arise out of this account of development in Palanpur?  An
important message is that alongside population growth, there can be local, community-level
factors that counteract, or offset, the positive consequences of a broad expansion of economic
opportunities.  This is clearly relevant for those who wish to assess the impact of the economic
reforms on rural wellbeing. We have pointed to community level inequality as a serious potential
constraint on economic and social development.  We have also emphasized that village
institutions cannot be expected to persist, unaffected, by overall economic change.  We have
indicated that, at least in some respects, with economic change village markets may become
more remote from the poor.
It is of course an important question whether the processes described for Palanpur have also
taken place in other villages in India, or South Asia more generally.  Perhaps one of the reasons
relatively little attention has been paid to some of the issues discussed here is that they areWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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particularly difficult to document with conventional large-scale survey instruments.  One of the
objectives of this paper has thus been to illustrate the value of detailed case-studies as
complements to larger scale surveys.  An important challenge is to develop approaches to
investigate the issues raised here, in such a way that broader inferences do become possible.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
30
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TABLE 1
PALANPUR, 1993: VILLAGE PROFILE
Location: 13 kilometres north of Chandausi, a small
town in Moradabad district
Population: 1,133
Number of households: 193
Proportion of Muslims (%): 12.5
Main Hindu castes
a: Thakur, Murao, Dhimar, Gadaria, Passi, Jatab
Literacy rate, age 7+ (%):
female 9
male 37
Main economic activities: agriculture,  livestock,  wage  employment
outside the village
Total land owned
b: 2,383 bighas
(372 acres)
Proportion of landless households (%): 23
Proportion of land irrigated (%): 96
Main crops: wheat, rice, sugarcane, bajra,
jowar, vegetables, pulses
Main public amenities: primary school, railway station
temples, wells, pond
a On the size and other characteristics of different castes, see Table 2 below.
b Not including residential plots.
Source: Drèze and Sharma, 1998 (Chapter 1, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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TABLE 2:  CASTE COMPOSITION OF THE VILLAGE POPULATION, 1993
Caste Number of
individuals
a
Traditional caste
occupation
Main current
occupations
b
Annual
growth rate
of
population,
1957-93
c
Literacy rate, age
7
+
(percentage)
Land
owned per
capita
d
(bighas)
Percentage of
households
with at least
one regular job
Per-capita
income,
1983-4
(Rs/year)
Male Female
Thakur  283  (48) warriors CT, RJ  2.8 (2.7) 56 19  2.4 (1.9)  21 1,119
Murao  294  (44) cultivators CT  2.6 (2.7) 39  2  3.5 (3.5)  14 1,265
Dhimar   82  (14) water-carriers CT, RJ  1.1 (1.8) 35  8  0.5 (1.3)  36 1,026
Gadaria   89  (14) shepherds CT, RJ  2.1 (2.5) 26 11  1.9 (2.2)   7 1,112
Dhobi
e   31   (5) washermen CT, RJ, CL  4.6 (n/a) 15  0  1.6 (2.0)   0   922
Teli
e  109  (20) oil-pressers CT, RJ, CL  2.3 (2.2) 21  3  1.1 (1.9)  15   784
Passi
f   62  (15) mat-makers CT, RJ  0.3 (1.2) 46  7  1.3 (0.6)  13 1,202
Jatab
f  133  (24) leather workers CT, CL  1.7 (2.0) 12  0  1.3 (1.4)   0   436
Other   50   (9) Miscellaneous RJ, SE  1.5 (-1.3) 57 29  0.5 (0.8)  44 1,023
ALL
CASTES
1,133 (193) Miscellaneous CT, RJ, CL  2.1 (2.3) 33  8  2.1 (2.1)  17 1,025
a Number of households in brackets.
b CT = cultivation; CL = casual labour; SE = self-employment; RJ = regular job.
c In brackets, migration-adjusted population growth rates (see chapter 3 for details).
d In brackets, land cultivated per capita (bighas).
e Muslims.
f Scheduled caste.
Note: The arrangement of castes in this table follows Bliss and Stern (1982).  The term "regular job" refers to wage employment with monthly salary and some
security of employment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Source: Drèze and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt. 1, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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TABLE 3
REAL INCOMES IN PALANPUR, 1957-84
1957-8 1962-3 1974-5 1983-4
Per-capita income at current prices
(Rs/year)
173 149 1,039 1,025
Index of per-capita income at current
prices
(1957-58=100)
100  86   602   594
Real per-capita income at 1960-1
prices
a
161 152   275   194
Inequality indices
  Gini coefficient
  Coefficient of variation
  Atkinson index (ε = 1)
  Atkinson index (ε = 2)
  Atkinson index (ε = 5)
0.336
0.649
0.178
0.338
0.647
0.390
0.871
0.251
0.485
0.821
0.253
0.504
0.105
0.206
0.483
0.307
0.545
0.158
0.342
0.741
Poverty indices
  Head-count index
  Poverty-gap index
  Squared-poverty-gap index
0.47
0.18
0.09
0.54
0.24
0.14
0.11
0.03
0.02
0.34
0.12
0.07
a Calculated by deflating the nominal per-capita income figures by the Consumer Price Index for
Agricultural Labourers for Uttar Pradesh, with 1960-1 as the base.
Note: The inequality and poverty indices appearing in this table are based on treating each individual as
one observation, with each individual within a household having the same per-capita income.
Source: Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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TABLE 4: CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OF MAJOR DURABLES, 1957-93
Item Per-capita
ownership in
1957-8
(number per
1,000
persons)
Per-capita
ownership in
1993
a
(number per
1,000
persons)
Share of selected groups in total ownership,
1957-8, divided by share of population
b
(percentage)
Share of selected groups in total ownership, 1993,
divided by share of population
b
(percentage)
Thakurs
(20%)
Muraos
(22%)
Muslims
(10%)
Jatabs
(13%)
Thakurs
(25%)
Muraos
(26%)
Muslims
(12%)
Jatabs
(12%)
Productive assets
Persian wheels
Pumping sets
Electric tubewells
Threshers
Tractors
Flour mills
Cows and female buffalos
Bullocks & male buffalos
 21
  0
  0
  0
  0
  0
169
235
  0
 36
  1
  6
  8
  3
138
 92
1.1
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
1.8
1.5
3.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
1.3
1.3
0.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
0.3
1.2
0.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -
0.4
0.8
 -
1.2
0.0
0.6
0.4
0.0
1.3
0.8
 -
1.5
3.9
2.8
2.6
1.3
1.0
1.3
 -
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.3
1.0
0.8
 -
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
1.1
Consumer durables
c
Pacca building
d
Bicycles
Radios
Watches
Sewing machines
Motorcycles
Televisions
Guns
 21
  7
  0
 19
  0
  0
  0
n/a
 94
 77
 47
 99
 23
  2
  3
  3
2.1
3.8
0.0
2.3
 -
 -
 -
 -
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
 -
 -
 -
 -
1.2
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.0
1.3
4.0
1.1
1.4
1.3
1.3
0.9
3.8
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.9
0.3
1.5
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
a Since the 1993 village population (1,133 persons) was not very different from 1,000, the numbers in this column can also be interpreted as rough indicators of the absolute numbers
of the relevant items in 1993.
b The percentages in brackets below caste names indicate the population share of the relevant caste in the relevant year.  These population shares to not add up to 100 per cent, since
the "others" category is omitted.
c Data on consumer durables relate to 1962-3 and 1990, instead of 1957-8 and 1993.
d A household is counted as owning a pacca building if at least part of its residential dwelling is made of bricks or other concrete material.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Source: Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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TABLE 5
WEALTH ESTIMATES, 1962-3 AND 1983-4
Estimated value of assets per capita
(Rs at 1960-1 prices)
Gini coefficient
1962-3 1983-4
a 1962-3 1983-4
Assets
(1)  Productive assets and consumer
durables
(2a) Land  (k=1/2)
(2b) Land  (k=2/3)
(3)  Total assets (1+2)
k=1/2 (1+2a)
k=2/3 (1+2b)
Liabilities
(4)  Debts to outsiders (mainly formal
credit institutions)
Net Wealth (3-4)
k=1/2
k=2/3
   70
  294
  391
  364
  461
   22
   342
   439
   91  (1.25)
  512  (2.6)
  512  (1.3)
  603  (2.4)
  603  (1.3)
   79  (6.1)
  524  (2.0)
  524  (0.8)
 0.43
 0.50
 0.50
 0.457
 0.464
 n/a
≈  0.46
b
≈  0.46
b
 0.36
 0.49
 0.49
 0.47
 0.47
 0.71
 n/a
b
 n/a
b
a In brackets, the implied exponential growth rate since 1962-3.
b Since liabilities were small in 1962-3, the Gini coefficient of net wealth for that year must have been close to
the Gini coefficient for total assets (shown in the same column).
Notes: (1) The parameter k is the value of irrigated land in 1962-3 as a proportion of its 1983-4 value (at
constant prices).  (2) The calculations also assume that the value of unirrigated land in 1962-3 was one third of
the value of irrigated land.   (3) Strictly speaking, the calculation of the Gini coefficient for liabilities in 1983-4
should take into account debts to village lenders; but these are small relative to outside debts.  (4) Buildings and
other "non-quantifiable assets" are excluded from all the calculations.  (For further details see Table 9 and text,
Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).
Source: Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Table 6
Literacy and Education in Palanpur: 1957/8 - 1993
Literacy rates (%)
1957-8 1962-3 1974-5 1983-4 1993
male, age 7+ 18 34 34 30 37
female, age 7+ 1 3 6 6 9
male, age 10-14 31 64 51 33 34
female, age 10-14 5 10 8 8 12
Source:  Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Appendix to Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
41
TABLE 7
PALANPUR: POPULATION IN DIFFERENT SURVEY YEARS
1957-8 1962-3 1974-5 1983-4 1993
Population 528 585 790 960 1,133
Number of households 100 106 117 143 193
Average household size  5.3  5.5  6.8  6.7  5.9
Female-male ratio  0.87  0.87  0.85  0.93  0.85
Annual growth rate of
population since previous
survey
a (%)
  -  2.2
(2.3)
 2.5
(2.7)
 2.2
(1.9)
 1.7
(2.2)
Age distribution of the
population (%)
 0-14
15-24
25-44
45-64
 65+
 39
 21
 23
 14
  3
 38
 19
 25
 13
  5
 46
 15
 25
 12
  2
 44
 20
 23
 10
  3
 41
 21
 22
 12
  4
Proportion of the population
in different caste groups (%)
Thakur
Murao
Muslim
Jatab
Other
 20
 22
 10
 13
 35
 21
 23
 10
 12
 34
 22
 23
 12
 12
 31
 23
 23
 12
 12
 30
 25
 26
 12
 12
 25
Proportion of households of
different types
b
single-person
nuclear
stem
joint
  6
 45
 28
 21
  6
 44
 28
 22
  3
 41
 29
 28
  3
 44
 33
 20
  3
 54
 31
 12
a In brackets, the corresponding "migration-adjusted growth rate", defined as the population growth rate
for the set of households that stayed in the village throughout the survey period.
Note: The 1974-5 population includes 6 households excluded by Bliss and Stern (1982) on the grounds
that these households were not involved in cultivation.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
42
Source: Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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Table 8
Cultivation Details for Selected Major Crops in Palanpur
Crop 1957/58 1962/63 1974/75 1983/84
1.  Wheat
a)  Area cultivated (bighas) 879 767 1030 1573
b)  % of total cultivated area
b 52% 48% 46% 57%
c)  Yield (kg/bigha) 41 41 114 101
d)  Real Output Value/bigha
c 16.46 22.07 41.17 26.53
2.  Paddy
a)  Area cultivated (bighas) 70 274 125 266
b)  % of total cultivated area
b 5% 17% 6% 12%
c)  Yield (kg/bigha) 11 26 103 130
d)  Real Output Value/bigha
c 2.13 9.77 32.63 34.32
3.  Bajra (millet)
a)  Area cultivated
a (bighas) 644 638 610 137
(730) (363)
b)  % of total cultivated area
b 46% 40% 29% 6%
c)  Yield (kg/bigha) 34 27 59 48
d)  Real Ouput Value/bigha
c 10.16 11.76 20.05 11.69
(20.31) (13.68)
a  The figures in brackets include plots sown with mixed crops.  In these cases the area figures are upper
bounds on the effective areas.
b  Proportion of area cultivated refers to percentage of area under the specified crop for the relevant season
(rabi for wheat; kharif for paddy and bajra).
c  Real values are obtained by deflating with price deflators used elsewhere based on the Consumer Price
Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) for Uttar Pradesh.  All values are in 1960/61 rupees.
Notes:
1.  The average yield figures for 1962/63 in this table are somewhat misleading in that they exclude cases
of zero output, which were not uncommon in that year due to total crop failure on a number of plots.  The
true average yields, inclusive of cases of zero output, would be lower.
Source: Lanjouw and Stern, 1998 (Chapt 3, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
TABLE 9
OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE, 1957-93: SUMMARY
Occupation type Number of adult males
with the stated occupation
in 1957-8
Number of adult males
with the stated
occupation in 1993
as a primary
occupation
a
as a secondary
occupation
as a primary
occupation
a
as a secondary
occupation
Cultivation and livestock 141  (81)  12 188  (54)  13
Self-employment (non-farm)
of which:
   specialised caste occupations
b
   other skilled self-employment
   unskilled self-employment
c
  6  (3)
  6
  0
  0
  2
  2
  0
  0
 19   (5)
  1
  8
 10
 10
  2
  4
  4
Wage employment (regular or semi-
regular)
of which:
   regular job (skilled)
   regular job (unskilled)
   seasonal or semi-regular (skilled)
   seasonal or semi-regular (unskilled)
  5  (3)
  1
  4
  0
  0
  6
  0
  4
  0
  2
 50  (14)
  7
 24
  1
 18
  4
  0
  1
  0
  3
Wage employment (casual)
of which:
   agricultural labour
   unspecified casual labour
 22 (13)
 22
  0
 24
  7
 17
 31  (9)
 17
 14
 35
 18
 17
Study   0   (0)   0  30   (9)   0
Other   0   (0)   0   8   (2)   0
None   1
d  (1) 131  22
d  (6) 286
TOTAL 175 (100) 175 348 (100) 348
a Percentage distribution in brackets.  
b Barber, sweeper, carpenter, etc.  
c Including shop-
keeping and door-to-door selling.  
d Mainly elderly or disabled men.
Note: The figures in the last row indicate the total number of adult males in the village.  A few
respondents reported having a third occupation (not included in this table).
Source: Drèze, Lanjouw and Sharma, 1998 (Chapt 2, Lanjouw and Stern, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 330
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